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FOREWORD
Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine from
2014, and Syria from 2015, caused widespread surprise among Western policy communities, including
in the United States. However, as the British scholar of
Russia, Keir Giles, explains in this Letort Paper, these
interventions represented the culmination of two
well-established trends that had been clearly identified by Russia-watchers over preceding years. These
were first, a mounting perception of direct threat
against Russia from the West, and second, Russia’s
own greatly increased capability for military or other
action to respond to this perceived threat.
Mr. Giles highlights the specific security preoccupations of Russian leaders over decades, not always
perceptible outside Russia, which lead them to entirely
different interpretations of current events from those
taken for granted in the West. This mismatch of the
understanding of the causes and drivers of world developments—and in particular, whether they are part
of an overall campaign of hostility against Russia—
carries with it the risk of conflict as Russia perceives
entirely innocent future actions by the United States
or the West as dangerous and destabilizing, and responds accordingly. This Letort Paper concludes with
a range of policy recommendations intended specifically to mitigate this risk.
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Consequently, the Strategic Studies Institute recommends this analysis of the key drivers of Russian
assertive action to policymakers and decision-makers
engaged in the relationship both with Russia and with
Russia’s European neighbors.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper examines the background to Russia’s use of military force in Ukraine in 2014 and Syria
in 2015, and investigates the roots of Russia’s new assertiveness and willingness to resort to direct military
action to resolve foreign policy challenges.
This Letort Paper identifies two long-standing
trends that led to this increased willingness: first, a
greater and more urgent perception of threat, whether
real or imagined, to Russia’s own security; and second, a recognition that Russia itself had regained sufficient strength, military and otherwise, to assert itself
and counter this threat.
Viewed through the prism of Russian threat assessment, events of the previous 15 years, including
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring, Western intervention in Libya, and election protests at home in 2011,
had all represented a single trajectory: they gave rise
to the perception that the West’s habit of fostering and
facilitating regime change by means of “color revolutions,” indiscriminately and with little regard for the
consequences, might have Moscow as its eventual
target.
The Munich Security Conference of February 2007
was the first point at which the West, in general, took
notice of the mounting dissatisfaction and alarm emanating from Russia at the state of the international order, and with what Russia perceived as unilateral and
irresponsible actions by the West led by the United
States. However, the themes that Russian President
Vladimir Putin elaborated at the conference were familiar from Russian state discourse over previous
years, as Russian concern over the new international
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order had already been growing rapidly. Instances
of foreign intervention from Kosovo onwards had
projected to Moscow a clear pattern of the erosion of
the notion of state sovereignty as an absolute. This
alarming prospect was accentuated by—as Moscow
sees it—an increasing tempo of unrestrained and irresponsible interventions by the West with the intention of regime change, leaving chaos and disorder in
their wake. The Orange Revolution cemented Russian
perceptions that Western-encouraged regime change
carried intent hostile to Russia.
Given the role and significance of Ukraine to Russia, Moscow perceived this as a strategic defeat. However, importantly, this perception was insufficiently
appreciated in the West—just as 10 years later in 2014,
the strength of Russian reaction was not considered
as a factor in what were ostensibly internal developments in Ukraine. The key difference in 2014 was that
Russia felt empowered to act instead of merely protesting. There is a parallel here with North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement—2004 was
also the year when the Baltic States achieved NATO
accession. This too provoked a vociferous and strongly negative reaction from Russia; however, with Russia still protesting from a position of relative weakness, this reaction was taken much less seriously than
similar sentiments expressed a decade later after clear
demonstrations of Russian readiness to intervene to
protect its perceived interests.
The fear of instability and “the accumulation of elements of chaos and anarchy in world affairs” are consistently expressed in Russian leadership statements.1
In this context, many Russian statements are redolent of nostalgia for the stability of a bipolar world,
where U.S. and Soviet interests were in balance. Rus-
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sian overtures to the United States, and the evident
desire to be treated as an equal partner, can be seen
as attempts to restore this balance. As stated by President Putin in 2014, “a bipolar system of international
relations used to lend stability to those relations. After that bipolarity disappeared, the law of the strong
replaced international law.”2
At the beginning of the current decade, the new
challenges arising from the Arab Spring confirmed for
the Russian security leadership that they had correctly
assessed the international situation as one of impending direct threat, based on the view that political instability in North Africa and the Middle East results from
the plotting of the West led by the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has commented
repeatedly that the negative outcomes of the Arab
Spring were a direct result of U.S. policy, and at the
height of the Arab Spring, former Russian President
Dmitriy Medvedev echoed the view that Russia was
vulnerable to the same kind of interference. This view
that political change in North Africa after the Arab
Spring came about as a result of Western information warfare and cyber-conspiracy, which could now
be implemented against Russia, fed into suspicion of
foreign orchestration at the time of Russia’s election
protests in late 2011 and early 2012—based on the
assumption that any alarming social phenomena in
Russia must be inspired from overseas.
Thus the prospect of destabilization close to home,
once again in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014, would
have been of acute and direct concern in Moscow.
Even without the accompanying disorder, the threat
of the “loss” of Ukraine to the West posed an immediate military problem: it appears to have been considered plausible in Moscow that this constituted an
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immediate danger of losing the defense industry in the
Donbass and the Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol,
together with the often-overlooked supporting infrastructure scattered across the Crimean peninsula, to
NATO. According to Secretary of the Russian Security
Council Nikolay Patrushev, the consequences could
be even more far-reaching: “Americans are trying to
involve the Russian Federation in interstate military
conflict, to facilitate the change of power by way of
using the events in Ukraine, and ultimately to carve
up our country.”3
Debate continues as to whether this belief in a
Western agenda to destroy Russia is genuinely held
or not. However, while important, the question is in
a way by this stage purely academic. The conviction
of threat from the West is expressed so persistently,
at all levels of Russian government and society, that
perception equates to reality. This is particularly the
case following the isolation of Russian media space after the beginning of the crisis around Ukraine, which
means that large sections of the Russian population no
longer have access to outside sources of information to
counterbalance the Russian state narratives of a nation
under siege and an impending hour of national crisis.
Nevertheless, while Russian threat perceptions remain consistent, Russia’s capability to address them
has changed drastically.
A key difference between Syria and Ukraine, and
previous confrontations where Russia did not play
such an active role, is that Russia now feels sufficiently powerful by comparison to the West— in military, political, and diplomatic terms—to mount active
countermeasures. Adroit manipulation by Russia of
the West’s confrontation with Syria over the use of
chemical weapons in 2013 averted the possibility of
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imminent military action, and represented a successful Russian gamble in testing its power and influence
by standing up to the West. Western intervention
in Syria, after strenuous opposition from Moscow,
would have destroyed all Russian political credibility.
Instead, by facing down and containing the West, Russia has gained legitimacy in some quarters as the protector of the status quo, sovereignty, and stability and
was emboldened by the confirmation that outmaneuvering the West is now possible. This contributed to
the confidence with which, a year later, initial actions
against Ukraine were undertaken—and subsequently,
the seizure of Crimea validated the post-Georgia view
that Russian direct military action can also be successful and lead to long-term strategic gain through presenting the world with a fait accompli.
Russia continues to present itself as being challenged by an approaching threat and that it must mobilize to confront that threat. Actions taken in response,
even if viewed by Moscow as defensive measures, are
likely to have severe consequences not only for Russia’s neighbors but also for their allies in both Europe
and North America. Understanding the Russian perspective of recent history, regardless of whether that
perspective is accurate or flawed, is essential for minimizing the risk of conflict that this entails.
ENDNOTES – SUMMARY
1. As, for example, in “Presentation and responses to questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on topical issues
of foreign policy of the Russian Federation,” Moscow, October
20, 2014, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
website, available from mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/B67488BB3E659D8444257D77004CCED0.
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2. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” Russian presidential website, March 18, 2014, available from kremlin.
ru/news/20603.
3. “Interview with Security Council Secretary Nikolay
Patrushev,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 11, 2015.
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THE TURNING POINT FOR RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
INTRODUCTION
We surely would be unwise to deprecate Russia today [in 1995] when her military strength is weak. We
would be inviting the Russians to rebuild that strength
in order to command our respect.1

Russian assertive action in Ukraine and Syria did
not denote a fundamental shift in Russian foreign
policy. Moscow’s response to developments in Kiev
in early 2014 merely accelerated and reinforced trends
that were in place long before. Both long-standing aspirations and mounting security concerns have now
been acted on by a much more assertive and confident
Russia: assertive in defending its interests, and confident in the leverage and power that it enjoys to do
so. These new characteristics resulted from the culmination of two important trends in the Russian view
of itself and the world. These were, first, a greater
and more urgent perception of threat, whether real
or imagined, to Russia’s own security; and second, a
recognition that Russia itself had regained sufficient
strength, military and otherwise, to assert itself and
counter this threat.
The Russian argument that the United States and
the West in general is in inexorable decline is offset by
a perception of varying threats from the United States,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
the European Union (EU).2 Throughout Russian, and
then Soviet, and then Russian history, the West has
always been seen as a destabilizing force that must be
resisted.3 What was new in 2014 and 2015 was a more
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direct and immediate sense of this threat, whether
imagined or not, and Russia’s confidence and ability
to actually do something about it.
Viewed through the prism of Russian threat assessment, events of the previous 15 years, including
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring, Western intervention in Libya, and election protests at home in 2011,
all represented a single trajectory. These events affect
Russian security in ways that are not always apparent
to Western policymakers. One root cause of this is Russian insecurity, leading to a perception that the West’s
habit of fostering and facilitating regime change by
means of “color revolutions,” indiscriminately and
with little regard for the consequences, may have
Moscow as its eventual target. In the meantime, those
regime changes that had already taken place created
sufficient regional destabilization to cause significant
and growing alarm in Russia.
This Letort Paper will seek to explain the Russian
reading of these past events, in order to give context
for present-day Russian actions.4 The difference between Ukraine and Syria, and previous confrontations
where Russia did not play such an active role, is that
Russia now feels sufficiently powerful by comparison
to the West—in military, political, and diplomatic
terms—to mount active countermeasures.
PREHISTORY
It is uncontroversial to suggest that the Munich
Security conference of February 2007 represented an
important point in the evolution of relations between
Russia and the West. However, it must be stressed
that this is not because of any display of a new vector
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in Russian foreign policy. Instead, this was the first
point at which the West in general took notice of the
mounting dissatisfaction and alarm emanating from
Russia at the state of the international order, and with
what Russia perceived as unilateral and irresponsible
actions by the West led by the United States.
In media representations of the time, this was
one of the many iterations of the sudden resurgence
of Cold War analogies since 1989.5 However, for the
Russia-watching community, the extent of international surprise at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
comments was unexpected. The themes that Putin
elaborated on at the conference were familiar from
Russian state discourse over previous years, and the
forthrightness with which they were expressed had
been gradually mounting over that period. It is likely
that the reason why the 2007 speech received such attention by comparison to previous expressions of the
same concern was its directness. After all, as President
Putin himself said:
This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout,
pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to say what I really think
about international security problems.6

Putin had been saying, in fact, what he thought for
some time; but in the West, if the message was received
at all, it was not understood. A wealth of examples
is available, but one may be sufficient to demonstrate
the point. In 2004, the Russian perception of destabilizing threats sponsored from abroad—highlighted in
Munich 3 years later—was already well developed.
However, the comments made by Putin at a press conference toward the end of that year, while reflecting
3

this concern, would not have conveyed it to a foreign
audience since the Russian context in which they were
framed would be unrecognizable to Western politicians viewing the same processes:
If we are to speak of post-Soviet space, I am most concerned by attempts to resolve political issues by nonlegal means. This is the greatest source of danger. The
most dangerous activity is to create a system of endless
revolutions—rose revolutions; what will they think of
next—blue revolutions? We need to get used to living
by the law, and not political expediency, as defined
in some distant place, on behalf of one people or another. Within society itself, clear rules and procedures
have to evolve. Of course, we must also be aware that
democracies need to be supported and helped, but if
we take the path of endless revolutions, there will be
nothing good in it for these countries, and their peoples. We will drown the entire post-Soviet space in a
chain of never-ending conflicts, that will have fairly
tragic consequences.7

Russian security thinking was widely ignored by
the West while Russia was weak and could easily be
overlooked except as a potential source of dangerous
instability itself in the event of state collapse. Viewed
from Moscow, the picture was very different. In
1995—when Russian defense capability was rapidly
approaching its nadir—a study commissioned by the
Russian Ministry of Defense found that the United
States and its allies still represented the main threat to
Russian national security, and recommended a return
to a nuclear stand-off and reoccupation of the Baltic
states to counter “Western attempts to isolate and destroy Russia.” Other recommendations included economic protectionism, a military-nuclear alliance with
Iraq, Iran, and Libya, and the creation of a new state
including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.8
4

Nevertheless, when interviewed shortly after his
arrival in power, President Putin stated that, “in many
ways Russia has changed the principles of its foreign
policy. Russia no longer attempts to impose its will on
anybody. We are prepared to take part in international affairs on a broad-based democratic basis.”9 In the
context of the time, it is not inconceivable that this was
a sincere aspiration; but a radical revision of Putin’s
assessment of the danger posed by the West to Russia
would ensue. All post-Soviet Russian leaders have begun their tenure hoping for close cooperation with the
West, then become disillusioned. This applies equally
to Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir
Putin. The cyclical nature of relations between Russia and the West, where high intentions founder on
incompatible strategic priorities and a confrontation
ensues, followed by a reset, has considerably greater
impact in Moscow than in European and North American capitals with significantly more limited institutional memory.10
THREAT PERCEPTION
The fear that the West is considering bringing
about regime change in Russia does not stand up to
objective scrutiny, despite being occasionally encouraged by loose talk from the United States about direct interference in the post-Soviet space in order to
counter Russian projects and interests.11 Nevertheless, it appears deep-rooted among a broad sector of
the Russian security elite. It has been accentuated in
the past decade by, as Moscow sees it, unrestrained
and irresponsible interventions by the West with the
intention of regime change—the “color revolutions”
and the Arab Spring—leaving chaos and disorder in
their wake.
5

One contributory factor commonly underestimated in the West is Russia’s self-perception. Russia
sees its wealth—defined almost universally in terms
of abundant natural resources—as a tempting target
for foreign powers to seize. Projection of Russian attitudes onto those foreign powers in a form of mirroring makes it plausible within Russia that the country
presents an attractive target for foreign intervention,
with aims up to and including regime change, in order
to gain control of those same natural resources. As expressed by former Russian envoy to NATO and now
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin:
Russia is an enormous country with a small population, we only have 140m people, it is not many, but it
is the largest and richest [sic] country. Therefore we
have to bear in mind that we should not have any illusions about our security. We need to be very physically strong and have brute physical force in order to
protect our riches, because lots of people are trying to
creep towards them.12

This provides context for Russia’s portrayal of
NATO enlargement as a threat. Regardless of NATO’s
intent, it presents a menace simply by “approaching
Russia’s borders,” a problem augmented by the permanent and persistent belief throughout history that
Russia’s land borders present a critical vulnerability,
and in order to protect itself Russia must exert control far beyond them.13 This is also a factor in Russian
perception of instability in the Middle East as being a
much more immediate and local threat to Russia by
comparison with the European view of a relatively distant problem that only affects the homeland through
generating uncontrollable flows of illegal immigrants.
By Russian geographical standards, as expressed by
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one senior Russian general, the Middle East is “sovsem
ryadom” (“right next door”).
It also sheds light on the deep suspicion and hostility shown toward the persistent efforts by Western
nations to foster democratic instincts in Russia and
its neighbors, including by means of direct support
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sanctions and economic pressure, too, take on a more directly threatening aspect in Moscow than may appear
from Brussels or Washington, DC. It is asserted that
the Western sanctions imposed in 2014 are not only
intended to undermine Russia’s economy and administer “punishment” for Crimea, but in fact have the
ultimate aim of regime change—even though there is
little doubt that uncontrolled regime change in Russia would be directly contrary to Western interests.14
But according to former Russian Minister of Finance
Yegor Gaidar, concerted economic pressure can have
devastating results: “The timeline of the collapse of
the Soviet Union can be traced to September 13, 1985,”
when Saudi Arabia decided to increase oil production
in order to abandon price protection.15 The consequent
collapse in oil prices contributed directly to the end of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the
current context of economic challenges to Russia as a
result of a less dramatic, but still impressive, fall in oil
prices, this cannot be far from the minds of President
Putin and his advisers.
Thus the prospect of destabilization close to home,
in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014, would have been
of acute and direct concern in Moscow. Even without
the accompanying disorder, the threat of the “loss”
of Ukraine to the West posed an immediate military
problem: it appears to have been considered plausible
in Moscow that this constituted an immediate danger

7

of losing the defense industry in the Donbass and the
Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol, together with the
often-overlooked supporting infrastructure scattered
across the Crimean peninsula, to NATO. According
to Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolay
Patrushev, the consequences could be even more farreaching: “Americans are trying to involve the Russian Federation in interstate military conflict, to facilitate the change of power by way of using the events
in Ukraine, and ultimately to carve up our country.”16
The fact that it was the prospect of an agreement
with the EU, rather than NATO, which triggered
events in Ukraine is indicative of the wide range of
different challenges that the West in its various forms
poses to Moscow. Russia fears EU integration for
neighboring states because of the prospect of their
systems and economies becoming governed by rules,
transparency, and values that are an existential challenge to the Russian system. Russian actions are thus
not entirely prompted by unwarranted paranoia; this
is an objective threat to the Russian way of doing business, and hence to the incomes of the leadership elites.
In this context, it was not as startling as is widely
stated that it was the prospect of an EU Association
Agreement for Ukraine, rather than any involvement
with NATO, which would eventually lead to military
intervention by Russia. As long ago as 2007, even before the Georgian conflict, an EU study highlighted the
incompatibility of the EU approach to Ukraine with
Russia’s stated security interests. It recommended that
“as a matter of urgency the EU needs to think over
its foreign policies in the Eastern Neighborhood with
great care, bearing in mind their impact on relations
with Russia, as well as Moscow’s possible response.”17
Moreover, in 2011, a closed conference in the United
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Kingdom (UK) was told by a senior Russian official
that the EU’s Eastern partnership program “was a signal to Moscow that the EU had its eyes on the FSU
[former Soviet Union] space.” In theory, the program
was not anti-Russian, in the same way, as a program
with Portugal, for example, would not be considered
anti-Spanish; but it was undeniably anti-Russian in its
claims of spheres of interest. Viewed from Moscow,
the distinction was academic. From President Putin’s
perspective, both NATO and the EU had a very clear
agenda—even if it may not always have been clear to
the organizations themselves.
Debate continues as to whether this belief in a
Western agenda to destroy Russia is genuinely held
or not. However, while important, the question is in
a way by this stage purely academic. The conviction
of threat from the West is expressed so persistently,
at all levels of Russian government and society, that
perception equates to reality. This is particularly the
case following the isolation of Russian media space after the beginning of the crisis around Ukraine, which
means that large sections of the Russian population no
longer have access to outside sources of information
to counterbalance the Russian state narratives of a nation under siege and an impending hour of national
crisis. The strident anti-Westernism fostered among
the population by over a year of relentless indoctrination carries a momentum of its own, and causes even
sober and worldly Russian experts to assess Russia’s
security in terms of being surrounded by threats on all
sides. As put by Ruslan Pukhov, Director of Moscow’s
Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
(CAST) think-tank:

9

I think that if you are the current Chief of [General]
Staff, you should be having nightmares. You can hardly sleep at night when you see your resources have
shrunk, that your defense industrial base is not as good
as it was at the end of the Soviet Union—the USSR
collapsed at the peak of its technological might—and
then you have threats all around your borders. It’s not
an easy task to prepare a defense for this, and now
that we are under a technological embargo from the
West it will not be easy to fulfill the 2020 rearmament
program.18

In Moscow at present, only a very brave intelligence analyst who cared little for his career would
be putting forward assessments that NATO and the
United States do not in fact pose any threat to Russia.
INSTABILITY
An important underlying factor that drives Russian alarm at the prospect of foreign intervention is
the assessment that, even if unsuccessful, intervention
disrupts stable systems and creates dangerous disorder. The fear of instability and “the accumulation of
elements of chaos and anarchy in world affairs” are
consistently expressed in Russian leadership statements.19
Alarm at the prospect of destabilization instigated
from abroad is augmented and reinforced by Russia’s
collective memory of catastrophic upheaval during the
20th century. The state failures of 1917 and 1991, and
recent memories of the political and economic disintegration of the early 1990s contribute to fears of external
attacks seeking to compromise the stability of Russia’s
sovereignty. According to Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov, the experience of Russia, whose his-
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tory has “enough revolutions,” provides a cautionary
example because they always involve bloodshed and
significant retardation of the country’s development.20
It is argued that this fear of chaos strongly influences
President Putin’s attitudes “because for him, just like
other Russian politicians of his generation, the central
event of his life was the disintegration and collapse of
the USSR.”21
Putin has referred to revolutions in Russia as “a
rupture in history,” which should be disregarded in
order to understand Russia’s historical development
of the nation. According to Putin’s 2012 presidential
address, despite the fact that the upheavals of 1917
and 1991 constituted: “a devastating blow to the nation’s cultural and spiritual code . . . the breakdown of
traditions and historical unity, and demoralization of
society,” they should be disregarded when considering the history of Russia as an unbroken “thousandyear narrative.”22 President Putin’s characterization
of the events of 1991 as a “revolution” often surprises
Western observers. However, this is not a new development: as early as 2000, Putin was explaining to
foreign journalists that the developments of the 1980s
in the USSR were perestroika (restructuring), but by
the early 1990s, they had transitioned into a revolution.23 Biographers of Putin are keen to point out that
he actually missed the events of that period in Russia,
being stationed in East Germany at the time and only
returning to a profoundly changed country.
In this context, many Russian statements are redolent of nostalgia for the stability of a bipolar world,
where Soviet and U.S. interests were in balance. Russian overtures to the United States, and the evident
desire to be treated as an equal partner, can be seen
as attempts to restore this balance. As stated by Presi-
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dent Putin in 2014, “a bipolar system of international
relations used to lend stability to those relations. After that bipolarity disappeared, the law of the strong
replaced international law.”24
BEFORE LIBYA
This perception of threat was accentuated by—as
Moscow sees it—an increasing tempo of unrestrained
and irresponsible interventions by the West with the
intention of regime change, leaving chaos and disorder in their wake. Mismanagement of the aftermath of
Western invasion of Iraq in 2003 created conditions for
the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Western action in Libya in 2011 contributed to replacing a stable regime with an ungovernable space and
source of far-reaching instability and weapons proliferation. In the Russian perspective, Western support
for anti-government forces in Syria threatened to do
the same.
The “color revolutions” terminology lacks a strict
definition. However, in Russian usage, it can be broad
enough to include the changes of government in
Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005, and attempts at the same in Uzbekistan 2005, Belarus 2006,
and Armenia 2008. Some Russian lists also include the
removal of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000, the
“Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon in 2005, and events
in Moldova in 2009. This impressive list, in the Russian view, has one common denominator: the illegal
(but legitimized with Western support) replacement
of unpopular leaders with regimes that were more
amenable to the West. Amenable both because of declared commitments to build liberal democratic states
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on the Western model, and in the European context
through an aspiration for NATO membership and for
economic links with the EU as an alternative to cooperation with Russia.
The first of these color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, in Georgia in 2003, already suggested to
Russia that the United States was behind a process of
seizing that space for its own interests. According to
then-Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov:
There are plenty of facts that indicate that everything
that took place on those days was not spontaneous;
it did not happen overnight. There was preparation,
in which the U.S. ambassador actively participated,
according to the words of Shevardnadze himself.
The preparation was organized through the Soros
Foundation.25

The context of the time in relations between the
United States and Russia is important. This was not
long after the prospect of broad security cooperation
between the two countries had emerged following the
9/11 attacks: but even more recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq had sowed doubt in Russia as to the
strength of this relationship and, in particular, whether Russian views on international security would be
taken into account.
Russian alarm at events in Georgia, and concern
that they might be repeated elsewhere, was clearly
expressed, among others once again by Igor Ivanov:
[Regime change is] not in the interests of the countries
of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] nor
of stability in the region, nor international security. I
hope that the responsible political forces will not be
tempted to push any countries in the CIS onto that
path that led to the change of leadership in Georgia.
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The responsibility of Western countries is very great
here; they must not welcome, as some of them do,
what happened in Georgia, and they must assess the
events correctly.26

The following year saw the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine. Here, Russian perceptions that regime
change was precipitated by outside intervention
were even stronger. Given the role and significance of
Ukraine to Russia, Moscow perceived this as a strategic defeat. But, importantly, this perception was insufficiently appreciated in the West—just as 10 years
later in 2014, the strength of Russian reaction was not
considered as a factor in what were ostensibly internal
developments in Ukraine. The key difference in 2014
was that Russia, 10 years later, felt empowered to act.
There is a parallel here with NATO enlargement.
The year 2004 was also when the Baltic States achieved
NATO accession. This too provoked a strongly negative reaction from Russia; however, with Russia still
protesting from a position of relative weakness, this
reaction was taken much less seriously than similar
sentiments expressed a decade later after clear demonstrations of Russian readiness to intervene to protect its perceived interests.
Meanwhile, instances of foreign intervention from
Kosovo onwards projected to Moscow a clear pattern of the erosion of the notion of state sovereignty
as an absolute. This was categorically unacceptable
to Russia. The Russian response is visible in a number of domestic policy initiatives beginning with the
arrival of Putin in power at the turn of the century.
These include not only ideological constructs such as
“sovereign democracy,” but also legislation intended
to increase domestic control, for example, the contro-
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versial laws on foreign funding of NGOs and on regulation of the media. These fit the common objective of
an effort to prevent attempts at foreign influence on
Russian society and politics. Nevertheless, these concerns persist.27
A secondary effect of the 2003 Iraq invasion and its
mismanaged consequences was to reinforce and confirm Russian suspicion of democracy itself in the broad
sense, and particularly when “imposed from abroad.”
As described by Yevgeny Satanovsky, President of the
Institute of Middle Eastern Studies in Moscow, “The
development of Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s regime
was overthrown cannot be considered a model of democracy; more than this, it is the worst possible advertisement for democracy.”28 Even earlier statements, including by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin,
had drawn a direct equivalence between democratization and destabilization with a subsequent “potential
increase in extremism.”29 This too contributes to the
more recent campaigns to discredit the Russian liberal
opposition in mass consciousness.
Legality is a related concern. The repetitive Russian
emphasis on the primacy of international law is mirrored by statements stressing the importance of domestic law and constitutional order, as a prerequisite
for stability. According to President Putin speaking in
2005, “My greatest concern personally is not that some
kind of tumultuous events are occurring [in a former
Soviet republic], but that they go beyond current law
and the constitution. We all need to understand and
live by that law.”30
Abiding by national laws can be traced as a major
theme throughout the Russian responses to many international crises over the subsequent 10 years—up to
and including unrest in Syria.
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THE ARAB SPRING
The new challenges arising from the Arab Spring
confirmed for the Russian security leadership that
they had correctly assessed the international situation.
Vladimir Putin later stated that Russia’s initial reaction to the Arab Spring was positive “because there
were expectations of positive democratic changes.”
Russia’s concerns arose later, as a result of the Western
response to the uprisings—seen from Moscow as belligerent and interventionist—that Moscow blamed for
turning the Arab Spring into an “Islamist Autumn,”31
or indeed—as put by President Putin—an Arab Winter.32 At the same time, the rapid expansion of unrest
gave rise to concerns that the wave of revolution and
instability could spread to Russia’s neighborhood and
in particular the countries of Central Asia.33
In late 2013, a delegation from Russia’s General
Staff Academy visited NATO Defense College in
Rome, Italy. A primary theme of the briefings delivered was the negative outcomes of the Arab Spring,
and the manner in which the consequences of upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa were far
worse than the political situations that the upheavals
sought to address. Delegates provided a sobering list
of predictions of highly damaging second-order effects, many of which—including confrontation with
Islamic State and the spike in the Mediterranean migration crisis—were entirely accurate. Further predictions included an increased likelihood of major war:
as a result of not only the rise of political Islam and
the uncontrolled spread of Libyan weapons throughout the region, but also through a higher probability
of assertive action against Israel and, eventually, the
situation “when the Islamists gain enough strength to
mount a crusade against Europe.”
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This provides the context for the heightened perception of direct threat to Russia itself arising from
events in an apparently remote region in 2011-13. One
distinction that Russian academic analysis draws between the Arab Spring and the color revolutions is
that in the Middle East change and popular uprisings
were driven by internal social and economic problems; whereas in the post-Soviet states, internal factors played a less significant role than external interference. However, this is in contrast to the argument
that is pervasive among Russian defense and security
circles that political instability in North Africa and the
Middle East results from the plotting of the West led
by the United States. Sergey Lavrov has commented
repeatedly that the negative outcomes of the Arab
Spring were a direct result of U.S. policy, and at the
height of the Arab Spring, former Russian President
Dmitriy Medvedev echoed the view that Russia was
vulnerable to the same kind of interference.34 In a
widely quoted comment from February 2011, he said:
Look at the situation that has unfolded in the Middle
East and the Arab world. It is extremely bad. There are
major difficulties ahead. . . . We need to look the truth
in the eyes. This is the kind of scenario that they were
preparing for us, and now they will be trying even
harder to bring it about.35

LIBYA
A crucial turning point in the Russian attitude to
the Arab Spring, and more broadly to Russia’s foreign policy as a whole, was Western action in Libya.
Despite misgivings, Russia abstained from voting on
the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution
1973 in March 2011, in what was widely seen at the
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time as an unexpectedly helpful restraint from using
its veto.36 In doing so, Russia briefly stepped away
from its habitual position against interference in internal affairs. This represented a significant shift in
the normal Russian approach to international order
that must have been preceded by intense discussions
within the Russian political establishment. However,
subsequent events will have convinced many in Moscow that this move away from the traditional Russian
approach was an expensive mistake.37
The generous and elastic interpretation by Western powers of the resolution that Russia had allowed
to be passed had a number of serious effects on Russian policy. Any trust in the West’s good intentions
that remained within Russia was undermined. It was
made clear that strict limits must be placed on cooperation with Western powers in order not to prejudice
Russian interests. Dmitriy Medvedev, Russian president at the time, was publicly criticized by Putin and
subsequently seen within hardline Russian circles as
a weaker leader who had attempted to compromise
with the West and as a result, unsurprisingly, had
been deceived instead.38
This will only have reinforced an already existing
deep suspicion of working together with foreigners.
Reaching an international agreement through compromise and cooperation, which goes beyond direct
self-interest, is not in the spirit of Russian public diplomacy. As explained in 2007, on the front page of
Russia’s military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, any
suggestions that Russia can earn goodwill by making
compromises:
are pure deception. Moscow will not earn anything
from a policy of concessions. Quite the reverse, any
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retreat from our position would show weakness of
nerve on the part of Russian diplomacy. Krasnaya
Zvezda has already quoted the poet Yunna Morits,
and it is appropriate to quote her again: ‘When Russia
makes concessions, she gets her head smashed with a
hammer—paid for by countries who want to dismember Russia because they cannot eat her whole.’ And
this is a truth which is borne out by events from the
most recent history.39

Alternatively, as put more succinctly in a saying among British Russia-watchers, “One good turn
deserves another. Is not a Russian proverb.”
In the Russian perception, Libya represents not only
the unconstitutional removal of a legitimate leader,
but also a dangerous precedent as a model of revolution for implementation by the West elsewhere.40 Following the descent of Libya into dangerous chaos—an
entirely predictable development—Russia noted a
pattern consistent with the deterioration of the situation in Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.41
Already at this stage, preventing a similar development of events in Syria became an important Russian
foreign policy task.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Another important factor that accentuated the perception of threat for the Russian defense and security
services was the spread of the Internet. This represented a previously unavailable method by which hostile
powers could directly reach Russian citizens—a method that is now visible in Russian information warfare
efforts supporting the campaign against Ukraine.
The Russian intelligence services have consistently
and publicly stressed the potential for a detrimental
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effect on national security arising from connection to
the Internet ever since the Internet was available to
ordinary Russians.42 At a UN disarmament conference
in 2008, a Russian Ministry of Defense representative suggested that any time a government promoted
ideas on the Internet with the intention of subverting another country’s government, including in the
name of democratic reform, this would be qualiﬁed as
“aggression” and an interference in internal affairs.43
It is often not fully appreciated that specific activities that Western powers routinely encourage on the
Internet, with intentions largely grounded in human
rights rather than security concerns, are interpreted
by Russia as hostile actions.44 As a result, the perception of vulnerability to “information threats”—hostile
activity using the medium of the Internet—has become ever more acute. As argued by Russian military
cyber experts in 2012, “this is not an empty scare—the
cyberspace warfare is already on.”45
Once again, Western actions in Libya contributed
directly to this heightened perception of threat to Russia. During the uprising and civil war there, social
media and online communication circumventing government control played a key role in regime change.
According to a study published by the U.S. Naval War
College:
Successful dispute of the government control of communications led to freedom of action in the cyber and
land domains. This freedom of action led to traditional
military support from the U.S. and NATO that ultimately allowed the opposition to achieve the physical objectives of defeating the Gaddafi regime and the
eventual election of a new government.46
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Translated to the context of Russian security concerns, this maps to statements like the one by Federal
Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) First
Deputy Director Sergei Smirnov in early 2012, “New
technologies are used by Western secret services to
create and maintain a level of continual tension in society with serious intentions extending even to regime
change;”47 and by Major-General Aleksey Moshkov of
the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in late 2011,
“social networks, along with advantages, often bring a
potential threat to the foundations of society.”48
The view that political change in North Africa after
the Arab Spring came about as a result of a Western information warfare and cyber-conspiracy, which could
now be implemented against Russia, fed into suspicion of foreign orchestration at the time of Russia’s
election protests in late 2011 and early 2012—based on
the assumption that any alarming social phenomena
in Russia must be inspired from overseas. During the
protests, President Putin said that he was offended
at seeing protesters wearing white ribbons that, in
his opinion, had been “developed abroad.”49 Earlier,
while still Prime Minister, he also said that protesters
had been “paid to participate” and that color revolutions were “tried and tested schemes for destabilizing
a society.”50
The notion of the Internet as a dangerous and hostile medium was subsequently vindicated by analyses
like the one above of the role of social media in the
Libyan civil war—that showed that they can be used
not only for the espionage, subversion, and circumvention of communications restrictions suspected by
Russia’s security services, but also for other instruments of regime change up to and including supplying targeting information for airstrikes.51
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Russia's response has been visible in a gradual
tightening of control over expression on the Internet
and, in particular, the increasing isolation of Russian
information space from the outside world.52 The language President Putin uses when referring to the Internet is indicative; during his 2015 end of year press
conference, he referred to the need for information relevant to the investigation of Prosecutor-General Yuriy
Chayka found on the Internet to be “nuzhno ochistit”
(“sanitized”).53 The measures taken to reinforce control over the Internet are in fact the re-establishment
of Soviet notions of information security, as exercised
by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and its
successors.54
The primary effect, interpreted in Russian doctrinal terms, is positive: Russia is now less accessible to
hostile information activities. However, the secondary
effect is to increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and conflict, as the Russian population—and by
extension their decision-makers—become increasingly isolated from reality and objective information on
which to base their planning and decisions.
EXCLUSION OF RUSSIA
Russia’s perception of a West that will stop at nothing to achieve regime change is reinforced by the impression that even when the leader that is scheduled
for removal makes concessions to his own population,
these concessions are not taken into account and the
process continues. In the case of Syria, Russia argued
that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had agreed to
accept a wide range of initiatives proposed by the international community for settlement of the domestic
crisis—including “peace initiatives by the League of
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Arab States, the Kofi Annan plan, the UN Observers’
Mission and the Geneva Communiqué,” as listed by
Sergey Lavrov.55 In the case of Ukraine, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with opposition leaders on February 21, 2014,
in the presence of representatives from the EU. In the
Russian view, this meant the opposition could have
come to power in a legal manner shortly thereafter,
because Yanukovych had accepted all their terms.56
Instead, according to President Putin, regime change
in Ukraine in 2014 took the form of a “coup d’état with
the use of force.”57
Seen from Moscow, the same approach appears to
be applied to Russia: active attempts at destabilization in the form of sanctions or support for Russian
opposition movements and figures are combined with
an unwillingness to seek agreement or even enter into
discussions with Russia on subjects of mutual concern. Despite strenuous efforts by the United States
to engage with Russian concerns over Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Europe, this conversation is
persistently presented by Russia as the United States
ignoring Moscow’s legitimate security concerns and
instigating a dangerous destabilization of nuclear balance.58 Similarly, Russian proposals for a new European security treaty have been persistently rebuffed,
and with good reason, by the Euro-Atlantic community.59 This has not prevented Russia from continuing
to present the terms of the treaty as a security benefit
for Europe: “After the destruction of the Berlin Wall,
our Western colleagues missed a historic opportunity,
ignoring Russia’s proposals to undertake joint development of the architecture of equal and indivisible
security in the Euro-Atlantic space.”60
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THE NEAR ABROAD
Like other colonisers, the Russians have had their ups
and downs in relations with the ‘colonised’, but in
their own mind the Russians have been the superior
people and imposed their own culture on the ‘natives’.
For these reasons the Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and the areas of central and Eastern
Siberia are ‘ours’.61

Russia’s attitude that it is entitled to domination
over its neighbors survives regime change and state
collapse—most recently in 1917 and 1991. An assessment of recent history in 1953, examining how Eastern
Europe had been lost to Soviet domination, concluded
that in the Russian view, “Stalin was no more than
reasserting Russian authority over territories which
had long recognized Tsarist rule, and which had been
torn away from Russia at the time of her revolutionary
weakness after the First World War.”62 Similarly, after
1991, Moscow has continued to act “as if the Soviet
Union had not fallen apart, as if it had only been reformatted, but relations between sovereign and vassal
have remained as before.”63 President Putin’s description of the 1991 dissolution of the USSR is informative,
“Russia voluntarily—I emphasize—voluntarily and
consciously made absolutely historic concessions in
giving up its own territory [emphasis added].”64
The effect of these long-standing assumptions is
a mind-set that leads to casual references by Russian
generals to nashi byvshiye strany (our former countries), statements that even Finland and Poland were
“parts of Russia,” and that all major powers have a
non-threatening sanitarnaya zona (cordon sanitaire)
around them.65 Russia’s attempts to maintain, or
24

reassert, this buffer zone are a major contributor to the
current standoff. Moreover, it is plain that at least in
some sectors of society, these aspirations by Russia to
regain imperial dominion over its surroundings enjoy
broad support. The now-celebrated former Prosecutor General of Crimea, Natalya Poklonskaya, in an
interview at the time of annexation declared her ambition to “start again in a great state, a great power,
an empire, like Russia [emphasis added].”66 In addition, at the first anniversary rally commemorating the
annexation of Crimea, an officially encouraged chant
was “Give us Poland and Finland!”67
SYRIA—2013
Expert opinion has offered a wide range of entirely
plausible rationales for Russian support of the Syrian
government.68 However, the Russian position on the
conflict in Syria remained entirely consistent since the
very beginning of unrest there. Its main principles are
that the fate of the nation is to be decided by Syrians
themselves; that anti-government interference from
abroad is not permissible; and that the path to settlement is an inclusive national dialogue including both
the opposition and the current legitimate authorities—in other words, President Assad.
The situation in Syria in 2012-13 represented a further inflection point after Libya. In 2012, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russian
MFA), along with many others, considered it possible
that the Syrian opposition would shortly achieve regime change.69 When this did not take place, Russia
perceived that the West appeared intent on toppling
another regime for their own purposes, with all the
damaging and destabilizing consequences that would
have entailed.
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The fact that former U.S. President Barack Obama
had called the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in Syria a “red line,” together with persistent
messaging indicating a military response, left no-one
in Russia doubting that Syria would be attacked in
September or October 2013.70 However, adroit manipulation by Russia of confrontation with Syria over
the use of chemical weapons averted the possibility of
imminent military action.
This represented a Russian gamble in testing its
power and influence by standing up to the West.
Western intervention in Syria, after strenuous opposition from Moscow, would have destroyed all Russian political credibility. Instead, by facing down and
containing the West, Russia gained legitimacy in some
quarters as the protector of the status quo, sovereignty,
and stability. This presented a major diplomatic and
geopolitical turning point. It supported the Russian
assessment that the United States can be manipulated
back from the brink of military action or intervention.
The powerful message sent to the regimes around the
world that are concerned about confrontation with the
West was, “Russia is back and can help save you.”
Furthermore, Russia confirmed for itself that outmaneuvering the West is now possible. This contributed to the confidence with which, a year later, initial actions against Ukraine were undertaken—and
subsequently, the seizure of Crimea validated the
post-Georgia view that Russian direct military action can also be successful, and can lead to long-term
strategic gain through presenting the world with a
fait accompli.
Success in Syria bolstered Russia’s aspiration toward recognition as a world power which, in terms
of influence, is on a par with the United States. This
latter point is a significant factor in Russian thinking
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regarding the West, which is not always perceived
there. Many Russian actions in the last 20 years can be
seen as efforts to rebuild the national status as a great
power that was lost in 1991. In this context, it needs to
be remembered that, in effect, Russia’s entire national
history is as a world-class power—with the exception
of the traumatic last 2 decades. Thus, the question of
status and self-perception needs always to be borne in
mind when considering Russian foreign policy, especially toward the United States and its closest allies.
The insistence that no regional security issue can be
addressed without the involvement of Russia reveals
the significance of Russian insistence on being treated
as an equal.
Some analysts have argued that this great power
aspiration constitutes its own ideology, which is now
driving Russian expansionist tendencies rather than a
desire for greater territory per se. For instance:
Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in March 2012, Russia’s foreign policy has been
motivated by major ideological concepts rather than
traditional geopolitical considerations of territorial expansion. . . . Indeed, Russia’s desire to re-establish its
great power status has become constant focus of the
Kremlin’s international behavior.71

Russia standing as a protector against revolution
and Russia standing against the United States, both
form the same attraction for third parties. Russia
represents itself as a herald of the post liberal order,
standing for anti-liberalism and traditional values.
This has a particular appeal for the Islamic world.
In any case, Russia’s efforts in key international security issues are also linked to the desire to reinforce
its status of an independent center of influence on
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international security. The rapid intensification of bilateral contacts between Russia and a number of countries of the region—for example: Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Turkey, and Egypt—after the Syrian chemical weapons deal suggests that this approach was successful,
and countries in the region saw advantage in Russia
presenting an alternative to the Western approach led
by the United States.
SYRIA—2015
In 2013, the primary goal of preventing a U.S.
military intervention and regime change in Syria was
achieved not by military means, but by a mix of assertive and persistent diplomatic efforts and support for
the Assad regime with money, weapons, and political
protection in the UN. In 2015, Russia felt sufficiently
empowered to move to direct military intervention itself, involving power projection of a scale and nature
not seen from Moscow for many decades.
From the earliest stages of this intervention, it
could already be seen that a number of Russia’s secondary objectives were successfully met. Moscow
once again showed itself as a reliable partner to other
Middle East regimes who had grown uneasy over the
depth of Washington’s commitment to them, with the
added benefit of embarrassing then President Barack
Obama.72 In other words, when “the region is falling
apart, and states are collapsing . . . the Russians are
willing to intervene to protect their interests and assert their power, and the United States is not.”73 Moreover, crucially, Russian operations in Syria achieved
striking success in diverting attention from the situation in Ukraine. This not only benefited Russia, but
also played into the hands of those European states
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that wish to return to business as usual with Russia
as soon as possible, including lifting the sanctions
that are damaging their own domestic economies.
The Minsk Accords on a notional ceasefire provide a
fig leaf; if Russia can be said to be abiding by them, it
can be claimed that Moscow is behaving in a civilized
manner.
As the deployment to Syria developed, additional
secondary benefits for Russia became clear. Air and
ground operations, and the substantial logistics effort
required to sustain them, were used as a further method of testing and evaluating new force structures, capabilities, and equipment. As explained by Russian
Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, “Today we
are acquiring priceless combat experience in Syria. It
is essential for this to be analyzed in the branches of
service and the combat arms at both the operational
and tactical levels.”74
However, the single most serious implication
of Russia’s intervention in the Middle East became
clear with the conclusion of the cessation of hostilities
agreement in March 2016. The terms of this ceasefire
achieved a Russian goal that had been consistent since
the beginning of the conflict: stopping military operations by opposition forces against the Assad government. It was also a substantial step toward another of
Russia’s key aims: a negotiated transition of power
in Syria, rather than the forcible removal of President
Bashar al-Assad previously insisted on by the United
States.
In effect, the change in U.S. policy from demanding the removal of Assad toward possibly accepting
him as part of a negotiated political transition represented a retreat in the face of Russian military assertiveness. This confirmation that United States policy
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can be changed through decisive military action can
only embolden Russia to be firmer in pursuit of its
objectives in future.75
RUSSIA IS BACK
A country which 10 years ago it seemed could be used
as a doormat is now demonstrating a political trajectory independent of outside influences, based on
dynamic economic growth.76

Recent developments have thus heightened the
sense of urgency and threat for Russian security planners. Meanwhile, while Russian intentions and security concerns have not changed, Russia’s capability to
address them has done so drastically. The move to a
more assertive foreign policy appears to have begun
in earnest after the handover of Russian presidential
power from Dmitriy Medvedev to Vladimir Putin in
2012. Putin’s perception of an external challenge must
surely have been exacerbated by the realization that
the great majority of Western politicians and commentators treated his reappearance as bad news. This
will have contributed to the steps taken to minimize
any possibility of external pressure via the Russian
elite, the opposition, or society as a whole. But a key
difference between Syria and Ukraine, and previous
confrontations where Russia did not play such an active role, is that Russia now feels sufficiently powerful
by comparison to the West—in military, political, and
diplomatic terms—to mount active countermeasures.
Russia is now in a position to exercise a much more
assertive foreign policy than in the recent past, thanks
to its own relative strength.
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From the mid-2000s, Russia benefited from a sudden influx of revenue thanks to higher oil prices and
began to review its perception of its own strengths accordingly. One result was an intensification in the pattern of Moscow employing a wide range of coercive
tools in attempts—not always successful—to maintain
influence and leverage over its Western neighbors.77
The stepping up of this program in the middle of the
last decade reflected Moscow’s growing self-confidence on the back of the increased oil revenues and,
hence, its ability to absorb any negative economic
impact from unfriendly actions against its Western
neighbors.78 High-profile incidents during this stage
included gas cut-offs for Ukraine in 2006, the crude
socio-cyber offensive against Estonia in May 2007, and
ultimately the use of military force against Georgia in
2008. In each case, the results validated this approach
for Russia: the Georgian conflict in particular demonstrated the validity of use of armed force as a foreign
policy tool bringing swift and effective results, with
only limited and temporary economic and reputational costs to bear.
From the earliest stages, the flood of new money
was reflected in huge budget increases for the armed
forces.79 In addition, after the armed conflict with
Georgia in 2008, an unprecedented and expensive
overhaul and rearmament of Russia’s armed forces
began and continues today. The progress of Russia’s
military transformation has been extensively reviewed
elsewhere and will not be repeated here.80 However,
an important point to note is that although Russia’s
military regeneration program had to wait for the
armed conflict in Georgia in order to receive the necessary political impetus to begin, it had been planned
long beforehand. This should not be interpreted,
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therefore, as a reaction to short-term developments
in relations with the West; in fact, its most intensive
phase coincided with the short-lived “reset” with the
United States.
Nevertheless, Russia under President Putin has
shown, in both Syria and Ukraine, that only small and
tangential amounts of actual applied military force are
needed to accomplish their political goals.
Russia caused widespread surprise with the speed
and effectiveness with which it moved large numbers
of its land forces to the border with Ukraine. However, the main role of those forces throughout most of
2014-15 was to sit on the border, augmenting and depleting as required, in order to focus the attention of
the West—like a hypnotist’s watch—while only small
groups of Russian special forces actually conducted
warfare inside Ukraine. Yet, President Putin was still
accomplishing his goals: undermining the Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko’s government, keeping
Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence, portraying Russia to the domestic audience as a strong
power successfully deterring U.S. ambition, and not
least, sending a strong message to other states in Russia’s vicinity not to step out of line.
The Ukraine campaign overall is, of course, far
more than a military operation. Successful coordination of military movements and action with other
measures in the political, economic, and especially information domains, is the result of strenuous efforts
by the Putin administration over preceding years to
harness other levers of state power to act in a coordinated manner.81 However, it would be impossible
without the threat of actual military force to back up
the other measures now classified by NATO in particular as “hybrid threats.”
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Russian military transformation remains a work
in progress, and further capability improvements are
to be expected. This is due both to the long-planned
and continuing reform and rearmament program,
and to actual combat and tactical experience in and
near Ukraine, to which a high proportion of Russia’s
ground troops have now been exposed to thanks to
troop rotations. In effect, in the words of one experienced analyst, the Russian military has benefited from
a “rolling live fire exercise” on the Ukrainian border, a luxury far beyond the imagination of Western
militaries.
Meanwhile, Russia’s air force and air defense systems benefit from intensive practice in Syria, with the
added bonus of testing themselves against NATO and
Israeli counterparts, and honing the skills of interaction with forward air controllers on the ground.82
The challenges posed to military modernization
by Russian economic deterioration and by sanctions,
while important, risk being overstated. The fall in
standards of living of ordinary Russians while funds
are diverted to fueling military regeneration is unlikely to have the same social effect as they would in
a developed Western nation, and this decline is offset
to a surprising extent by the boost in national pride
that results. As described in a Russian editorial in late
October 2015:
So if the economic collapse in Russia continues, pride
in the army still cannot fully make up for people the
absence of conditions for a normal life. But for now—
in a situation where the authorities live by tactics and
not by strategy,—the army and military mobilization
of the nation really look like a national idea, and a
panacea for the crisis, and a means of supporting a
high rating.83
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Russia has a considerable history of exposing its
citizens to privation in pursuit of military aims. As
noted in 1996, Russia has never “placed the welfare of
its people above its pretensions of becoming a Great
Power.”84
In the meantime, the progress of the campaigns
in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria show that Russia is already willing to make use of those parts of its forces,
which have already reached an acceptable level of
capability, even as the broad mass of those forces is
still under par. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, in its
current version, dates from early 2013 and makes no
reference to “color revolutions” or “Arab Spring” either in the list of threats to Russia or in the section on
regional priorities. However, when the drafting of a
new Military Doctrine was announced in 2014, it was
specifically intended to reflect “the emergence of new
challenges and threats to Russia’s security manifested
in the events of the ‘Arab Spring’, in the armed conflict
in Syria, and in the situation in and around Ukraine.”85
OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS
Fifty years ago, I learnt one rule in the streets of Leningrad: if a fight is unavoidable, you have to hit first.86

The crisis around Ukraine has brought Europe
closer to recognition that its values and interests are
incompatible with those of Russia and that if the West
wishes to support Russia’s neighbors in asserting their
sovereignty and choosing their own destiny, confrontation with Russia is the inevitable result.87 As put by
James Sherr:
some of our most cherished policies conflict with Russia’s own sense of right and entitlement. Supporting
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the ‘freedom of choice’ of Russia’s neighbours might
benefit Europe, but it conflicts with Russia’s interests
as Russia presently defines them. To a military establishment that equates security with dominance of
‘space’, the presence of NATO forces ‘in the vicinity
of Russia’s borders’ poses a ‘military danger’ irrespective of our intention.88

This also implies recognition that 2014-17 is not an
aberration in relations between Russia and the West;
rather, it is the previous 25 years of relative quiescence
that were the exception to the rule. European nations
have now been prompted by events to once more take
an interest in their own defense. Nevertheless, while
concentrating on countering and forestalling Russia’s
next unacceptable act of force, they must also be prepared for a sustained period of difficult and expensive
tension.89 In Russia’s neighborhood, the new normal is
a return to old ways.
There is a continuing debate among Russia-watching communities in the West as to whether Russia’s
actions are guided by a grand strategy, or are purely
opportunistic and tactical. One factor that is common
to both of these assessments is that Russia under President Putin will continue to be proactive and exploit
opportunities where they are presented. The West
should not precipitate Europe’s next crisis by unwittingly presenting a new opportunity through ignorance of the fundamental Russian security perceptions
that prompt Moscow to action.
Russia continues to present itself as being challenged by an approaching threat and that it must mobilize to confront that threat. The responses, even if
viewed by Moscow as defensive measures, are likely
to have severe consequences for Russia’s neighbors.
At the time of this writing, attention continues to be
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focused on the Baltic States as the most likely next
victims of Russian assertiveness. However, the delicate balancing act by Belarus should also be watched
closely: despite key differences with the situation in
Ukraine, there are enough factors in common that
Russian hostile action to protect its interests becomes
more likely with each step by President Lukashenka
toward rapprochement with the West.
The longer the West waits to make it clear that it
will resist Russia in terms Russia understands and respects, the harder and the more expensive this will be,
and the less chance there is that it will succeed. As noted by William Courtney and Donald Jensen, two topflight Russia experts with a substantial track record of
accurate assessments and predictions, “In responding
to Russian thrusts in Ukraine and Syria, the West has
relied on economic sanctions or conceded initiative
to Moscow. Experience shows that direct measures—
ones that target troublesome behavior—are more
likely to be effective.”90 Instead of the current practice
of U.S. and Western leadership figures handing the
initiative to Moscow by declaring what they will not
do in response, past experience shows that more assertive measures will be effective at establishing the
boundaries of acceptable behavior for Moscow.
SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Russian Armed Forces continue to see their need
to prepare to engage in future conflict as a massive,
high technology force and that their potential opponent continues to lie in the West.91
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General Issues.
It must be remembered at all times that realism, in
the international relations sense, is the guiding philosophy to which President Putin still subscribes, despite
other nations having moved on.92 Consequently, the
temptation to assess the options available to President
Putin from the standpoint of what appears rational in
the United States must consistently be resisted.
Moscow needs help in not misreading the West.
This means that messaging to Russia must be clear
and direct, rather than couched in diplomatic niceties.
The approach that President Putin adopts when expressing himself clearly provides a model for passing
messages back to him in a manner that will be immediately understood.
History is important to Russia, and historical parallels do carry weight and meaning. The “thousandyear narrative” referred to by President Putin may be
unrecognizable from abroad: but it needs to be taken
into consideration as part of the framework of his
decisions.
Bilateral U.S.-Russia Relations.
Cooperation with Russia on specific bilateral issues
is possible. However, cooperation in the wrong fields
can entail worse consequences than automatically rejecting Russian advances. If cooperation is declined,
the reasons for the rebuff need to be communicated—
it has to appear that this is not just happening through
incompetence or instinctive disdain for Russia.
Any cooperation with Russia needs clarity and
very distinct parameters. This is to avoid further disappointment and an emotional reaction.

37

The Russian narrative is that “nothing serious in
the world can happen without us.” If this is not acceptable to U.S. foreign policy in specific instances,
then this must be stated clearly.
It is crucial that the last 2 decades of assumptions
about Russia as a partner with shared interests must
be reversed and the reality of confrontation recognized. This should not lead inevitably to conflict: the
lesson of the Cold War is that coexistence is possible,
while recognizing the incompatible strategic interests
of Moscow and the West.
Practical cooperation with Russia is possible as
long as issues are ring fenced. Russia and the United
States can be not like-minded, but practically minded. An example is the continuing of Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations, focusing on
implementation. However, President Putin is seen as
not being as invested in control of WMD as the previous Soviet leadership.
Defense and Security Issues.
Planning for managing the Russia problem in
hard security terms needs to be long-term, rather than
treating 2014-17 as a “current crisis.” Russia will continue to present a challenge for the foreseeable future.
Restoring Russia’s status as a “great power” is not a
recent aspiration, but a consistent one, which Russia
now feels capable of realizing through influence on
its near abroad, up to and including the use of hard
power.
Russia can be expected to continue acting in its
current manner for as long as these actions are successful—in other words, unless and until the United
States and the West more generally respond in a way
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that is seen as meaningful in Moscow. This ought not
to mean a purely military response. Other options for
countering Russia ought to be available. Nevertheless, the European unity and support for the United
States, which would be necessary for other measures,
for example economic ones, remains questionable. In
the meantime, it is axiomatic—and proven repeatedly
over history—that Russia respects strength, and despises compromise and accommodation. This strength
must necessarily include military power, present and
ready for use, to provide a visible counter to Russia’s
own new capabilities.
Implications for the U.S. Army.
The role of the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR)
is critical in this regard, despite its much-diminished
size and the much-extended front line that it is now
called upon to defend.
The activities taken under Operation ATLANTIC
RESOLVE, funded by the European Reassurance Initiative, are essential and must be continued. It is these
measures that provide the most visible deterrence and
reassurance for the states to which the United States
has treaty commitments.
The scale and nature of USAREUR activities in the
front-line states is not sufficient to mount a serious
challenge to Russia’s current military capability; but
these and the simple presence of U.S. and allied forces
in these countries are sufficient that military adventurism will become much more, not less, complex and
unpredictable for Moscow to plan and undertake.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and other training teams operating with the Ukrainian army are harvesting essential operational second-hand knowledge of Russia’s
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new and restored capabilities. Substantial progress
has already been made in internalizing and acting on
these lessons, and optimizing skill sets that have not
been required in combat in decades.93 However, this
must be an ongoing process, in parallel with the continuously developing threat. In addition, knowledge
distribution among key allies must be a priority in
order to make best use of the enhanced capabilities offered by support and close interaction with both host
nations and deployed forces from third countries.
Finally, it is critical that authoritative voices describing U.S. and NATO defensive preparations in Europe as dangerous and provocative be disregarded.94
The opposite is the case: the likelihood of Russian military adventurism is in inverse proportion to the size
and capability of the military forces present and at
suitable readiness to deter it. In Russian thinking, conventional military power deficiencies present a temptation and an invitation; according to President Putin,
Russia “must not tempt anyone by our weakness.”95
The lesson for the United States is that demonstrable
readiness to defend itself and its allies is a fundamental requirement for avoiding conflict.
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APPENDIX I: THE MUSCOVITE MINDSET
The text below outlines some guiding principles of
the Russian approach to the world. It is included here
because it provides a thorough, yet succinct, guide
to those features of the Russian worldview that are
exotic to Euro-Atlantic thought and, therefore, make
understanding Russian behaviors highly challenging.
As such, it provides background for many of the Russian perceptions of the world outside described in this
paper.
This is the first time this text has appeared in a formal publication. It is lightly adapted from a post by
“Condottiere” on the United Kingdom’s (UK) Army
Rumour Service (ARRSE) website and reproduced
here with his permission.96

THE “MUSCOVITE MINDSET” IS
CONDITIONED BY ABOUT EIGHT CENTURIES
OF TOTALITARIAN RULE AND AUTOCRATIC
DESPOTISM.
(I need to clarify here that I use the term “Muscovite” to denote the ruling class, and its ignorant though
loyal serfs, of what is now generally known as Russia.
In actual fact there used to be many “Russias” or Russian princedoms which were all consumed by Muscovy. It is indicative that when the Prince of Muscovy
was proclaimed a Tsar (Emperor), he was proclaimed
Tsar of all the “Russias” (whether they liked it or not)
and claimed Moscow as the inheritor of and successor
to Rome and Constantinople—thus self-assuming a
leadership role for European civilization and an ambition for world power).
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A short and not exclusive summary of the
“Muscovite Mindset.”
1. For a Muscovite, it is inconceivable that state
power is not concentrated at the apex of the
pyramid. In Muscovy, this is at the Kremlin
and usually rests in one man or a small cabal.
No important decision can be made by any other organ. A Muscovite genuinely believes that
all political and economic power in the West is
ultimately controlled from Washington—just
as Moscow strives to control all political and
economic power in as large an area as it can, so
does Washington. Multiple power centers cannot be allowed to exist within a political entity
as this undermines the power of the center.
2. A Muscovite sees world affairs as a giant “zero-sum game” with the strings being pulled by
the major power centers. For a Muscovite, the
“Main Adversary” remains the United States of
America (USA). So anything which a Muscovite
perceives as detrimental to Muscovy is advantageous to the USA. An independent Ukraine
is detrimental to Muscovy, therefore the USA
must be causing the independence movement
there. For a Muscovite, independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) undermine
the power of the State, therefore they must be
operating under the aegis of Washington. Any
citizen of Russia that protests against the Kremlin is perceived by a Muscovite to be weakening
the State, therefore they are being supported by
Washington and can be considered traitors.
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3. The concept of “Rule of Law” is totally alien to
a Muscovite. A Muscovite firmly believes that
“the law” is just a tool to serve the ruler in order to make the State strong. It is for the ruler
to make the law and to apply it or change it as
required.
4. The concept of “Separation of Powers” is totally alien to a Muscovite. The “Executive” is
the only Power. The “Legislative” and the “Judicial” are mere (often cosmetic) appendages to
facilitate the rule of the “Executive”.
5. The concept of “Separation of Church and
State” is totally alien to a Muscovite. The
Church serves the State and it is inconceivable
that the Church can be regarded as a separate
power base.
6. The concept of an empowered “Civil Society”
is totally alien to a Muscovite. There can be no
organizations which are not answerable to the
State. The citizen is there to serve the State. The
State is not there to serve the citizen, but to use
him/her as it sees fit.
7. The concept of a “Free Press” is totally alien
to a Muscovite. The media is there to serve the
State. The media must reflect the State position.
If independent media offer a different point of
view, then they are attacking the State and are
seen as traitorous. Of course as this is seen as
detrimental to the State, it therefore must have
the backing of Washington.
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8. The Muscovite sees the world from this point
of view and naturally assumes that the rest of
the world must have a similar viewpoint (for a
Muscovite any different viewpoint is obviously
unnatural). As Muscovy sees all other political
entities as competitors in a “zero-sum game,”
therefore they all must view Muscovy in the
same way. As Muscovy is therefore constantly
under threat, it must defend itself. Attack is
the best form of defense, therefore Muscovite
aggression is logically defensive in nature and
thus Muscovy pursues a “peace-loving” policy
(even when invading other countries). There is
no contradiction in the “Muscovite mindset.”
9. Muscovy currently feels extremely threatened.
Not just from without, but from within. The
peoples of “all the Russias” are finally, slowly but surely realizing that there is a truth in
the world that is not the “truth” of the Kremlin. That there is another way of organizing a
society than that which has been forced upon
them by Muscovy for centuries. The countries
and nations that had been subjugated to the
“Muscovite Yoke” are incrementally breaking
away and making it successfully in the modern
“free” world. That Ukraine, the seat of the original great principality of Kievan Rus (the legacy
of which was stolen and warped by Muscovy)
was moving away from Muscovite control,
precipitated a crisis. If the so called “Little Russians” can embrace change in the organization
of their society - what will stop the so called
“Great Russians” from following suit?
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10. The “Muscovite Mindset” is also quite racist. This explains the pre-occupation with the
West and particularly the USA as the “Main
Adversary”; whereas a more logical conclusion
would be that the primary threat to Russia,
in terms of sovereignty (economic and political) is from China. But the Muscovite tends to
look down arrogantly on non-Europeans (conveniently forgetting his own historic tutelage
at the hands of the Mongols). However, it is
because of this that the “Muscovite mindset”
views the Chinese political system as similar
to its own and thus not a threat in the way the
Western political system is, in its potential to
undermine the control of the Kremlin through
its (perceived insidious) appeal to the masses.
ENDNOTES – APPENDIX I
1. Condottiere, “Chronicles of War in Ukraine,” discussion in
the online forum “The Intelligence Cell,” started by Domovoy on
May 9, 2014, Army Rumour Service (ARRSE), March 20, 2015, last
edited March 21, 2015, available from www.arrse.co.uk/community/
threads/chronicles-of-war-in-ukraine.213582/page-932#post-6344887.
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